Research & Commentary Results

The United States and Israel both hope for the grand prize: the emergence of a new regime in Iran to replace the Islamic Republic. For the US, this would close the chapter on a hostile and at times violent relationship that has endured since 1979. For Israel, this would see the end not only of a regime with a deep ideological commitment against it but also the foe that Israel sees as behind all fronts of the war it has fought since October 7, 2023.

Despite a dazzling military onslaught, an Iranian regime that faces a threat to its very existence is demonstrating an entirely predictable willingness to stay the course at all costs. As things stand now, the joint US-Israeli war risks ending in military victory but becoming a strategic failure.

The Israeli-U.S. military strikes on Iran that began on February 28 have done more than ignite a Middle Eastern war. They have sent shockwaves rolling across Asia, from the Strait of Hormuz to the Sea of Japan, exposing the brittle underpinnings of regional energy systems, straining diplomatic balancing acts, and forcing governments to make hard choices they have long deferred.

Nearly two weeks into the Iran war, one of Tehran’s most capable and disruptive regional allies, Yemen’s Houthi movement, has not entered the fight. The Houthis’ restraint reflects a strategic calculation by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

As the war with Iran consumes regional attention, Gaza is again being pushed aside. That is not just a humanitarian failure. It is a strategic mistake that could squander a rare opening for political transition while allowing Hamas to weaponize abandonment once more.

After months of trying to head off a US-Israeli war with Iran, Turkey now finds itself caught in the middle of it — and deeply concerned that a prolonged, regionalized conflict could pose serious security, economic, and political risks.

Once again, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, have dragged Lebanon into a war. But there are differences today. These differences are a cause for hope.

Following the tactical surprise of US-Israeli strikes on Iran, a crucial next step is the assessment of judgments about Iranian military sustainability, regime cohesion, escalation dynamics, regional spillover, allied responses, and plausible end states, and how those judgments interact with allied positioning, diplomatic activity, and economic constraints.

By attacking Iran without clear objectives or an exit strategy, the US and Israel turned what was the greatest strategic and chronic threat to regional security into an unpredictable set of imminent dangers. A fundamental task for US national security is to prevent this conflict from becoming a vortex that increasingly pulls in other powers.

Disarmament is necessary in Gaza. It is the only way to realize the goals articulated in the internationally endorsed 20-point plan laid out by the Trump administration. But a policy approach that makes disarmament a prerequisite for action on governance, recovery, freedom of movement for Gazans, and any credible political horizon is structurally and strategically counterproductive.

The balance of power in the Middle East is shifting. Iran is on the defensive — its military capabilities were badly degraded by last year’s 12 days of Israeli and US strikes, and growing protests at home have made the regime look more vulnerable than it has in years.

Today’s decision taken by the Lebanese government — to declare all of Hizballah’s security and military activities illegal — is a landmark development. But how the government and the Lebanese Armed Forces implement this directive now that a new round of attacks has actually taken place will be the ultimate test of their credibility.