Turkey has become a major player in Africa, with a particularly strong footprint in the Horn. While economic and energy interests’ matter, one sector now stands at the center of Ankara’s regional activism: defense.
North African governments have sought to remain outside the US-Iran conflict, regardless of their differing alignments and preferences. Geography insulates them from the fighting, but not from the consequences. That duality is the region’s predicament: what makes North Africa useful to others is what leaves it exposed.
Of all the fronts in President Trump’s peacemaking agenda, the South Caucasus has delivered the most concrete results. The August 2025 Washington Declaration, signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan and witnessed by Trump, marked an important step toward peace in the region. The two sides initialed a peace agreement and advanced plans to unblock regional connectivity, including through the establishment of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhijevan exclave through southern Armenia. Implementation of TRIPP has since made notable progress, but construction has yet to start. A breakthrough on those two tracks would, in turn, unlock Armenia–Türkiye normalization, transforming a long-fractured region into an area of trade and interdependence.
Wars don’t just end. They get interpreted, reinterpreted, and turned into strategic doctrine. That is what happened after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, a conflict that saw the United States back Tehran’s Iraqi adversaries. The war taught Tehran three lessons it never unlearned: that Washington wants the Islamic Republic gone, that Iran stands essentially alone in the world, and that it cannot survive a direct, overt fight with the U.S. and Israel.
With sanctions repealed, Syrian policymakers must ensure that growing volumes of credit reach beyond the narrow political and commercial networks that have generally dominated Syrian finance. That will require a credit strategy aimed at sectors and regions historically excluded from formal finance. Syria’s specialized state banks offer an imperfect but ready-made mechanism to do so.
It has become a commonplace for Americans to describe our current war with Iran as stuck in a kind of limbo, neither full war nor real peace. We’re not the only ones. Iraq finds itself caught in a limbo of its own, between America and Iran, between the tolerable and the intolerable, between progress and relapse.
The MENA Energy Recap is a quarterly review of key energy developments that took place in the region from April through June of 2026 and what they signal in the months ahead. The Recap views these developments through the lens of policy and strategy, energy security, and markets.
For more than a decade, assessments of Chinese strategy in the Middle East and Africa have focused on assets, including the ports Chinese firms own, the pipelines they finance, and the networks they build. This lens has produced familiar maps of Chinese “footholds” and debates over future military bases, but ownership alone reveals less about influence.
The more useful question is not what China owns, but how Chinese firms become embedded in the operational and digital systems that keep trade corridors moving. Influence derives not from controlling infrastructure outright but from participating in the governance of the networks that move goods, data, finance, and information across them.
Something more consequential than another oil market disruption is underway. The Iran war has exposed and accelerated an institutional weakness within OPEC that had been building for years. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the UAE’s departure, Iraq’s brief flirtation with exit, and the continued rise of U.S. oil production all point to a deeper question about the cartel’s durability. The issue has shifted from OPEC’s ability to manage crises toward whether its model of collective discipline can withstand mounting structural strain.
At the recent Lianhe Zaobao Singapore-China Forum 2026 in Singapore, Professor Joseph Liow, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and chairman of the Middle East Institute at the National University of Singapore, suggested that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) may be entering a “new normal”, one in which Iran — and perhaps Oman — could justify charging vessels fees for transiting one of the world’s most important waterways.
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is on something of a diplomatic roll at the moment. Having concluded a weeklong visit to the United States on July 19, 2026, during which he charmed President Donald Trump, al-Zaidi is now expected to head to Tehran to do the same with Iran’s new leaders. Trips to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria all figure on his itinerary, too.
This report outlines an actionable US roadmap to win in Lebanon, comprising eight chapters of specific policy interventions across the security, economic, and political dimensions needed to secure a sovereign Lebanon, lock in US gains against Iran, and permanently end the Israel-Lebanon conflict.
As part of a report outlining an actionable US roadmap to win in Lebanon, this article calls on the international community to focus on helping Lebanon transition from a market participant to a neutral Referee, strictly enforcing competition and the rule of law across both the public and private sectors.
As part of a report outlining an actionable US roadmap to win in Lebanon, the author analyzes previous international donor strategies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Ukraine as Washington and its Gulf partners consider how to assist the new Lebanese government in crafting and implementing a national recovery plan.
US President Donald Trump recently proposed that Syria intervene militarily against Hizballah in Lebanon. Is that a good idea? This episode of Middle East Focus features a recent MEI Virtual Briefing. Director of Communications Zeina Al-Shaib is joined by Ambassador David Hale, MEI Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow and Charles Lister, MEI Senior Fellow. Together they examine the prospects and implications of renewed Syrian involvement in Lebanon, the potential impact on US relations with both countries, and how evolving dynamics in Lebanon and Syria could reshape the regional balance of power and affect countries such as Turkey and Israel.