Research & Commentary Results

This article is part of a collection of short essays written by the Fellows of the Middle East Institute to explore aspects of the ongoing war with Iran. The intent of the collection is to help readers see new and unexpected elements of the dynamics and impact of the ongoing hostilities and to think harder, deeper, and broader about the implications of the conflict.

The outbreak of the war with Iran demonstrated the strategic value of maritime chokepoints in the Islamic Republic’s confrontation with the United States. But as Tehran’s strategy of using the Strait of Hormuz to pressure Washington seems to be backfiring, Iran is working with the Houthis to strengthen its leverage over another strategic chokepoint: the Bab el-Mandeb. The recent escalation in Yemen should be viewed within this context.

A war that the White House initially hoped would be brief has now dragged on for more than six months, with prospects for a resolution frustratingly remote, and the Trump administration’s credibility among friend and foe alike is nearly exhausted. Focusing on defense and security, there are multiple lessons from the Iran war that should shape US strategic thinking.

In February 2026, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested that shifting international dynamics could push Turkey to acquire nuclear weapons. That rhetoric, combined with Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy and research programs and its indigenous surface-to-surface missile development projects, has fueled concerns that these capabilities could eventually form the backbone of a Turkish nuclear weapons program.

When the US and Israel launched military action against Iran on February 28, 2026, it set in motion a chain of events that saw violence spread across the Middle East. Yet as the region found itself engulfed in conflict, Syria has experienced its most peaceful months in 15 years, and the government in Damascus appears determined to stay its course toward recovery.

More than 30 years after NATO overcame the threat from the Eastern Bloc, the alliance is struggling. Russia is waging war on Ukraine, the US is trying to pivot to Asia, and fresh conflict has erupted on Europe’s doorstep, with Russia and China both seeking advantage. Unexpectedly, for an alliance feeling unmoored, herein lies opportunity.

The war with Iran has not yet resolved the contest between Tehran and Washington, but it has already begun to reshape the Middle East — and nowhere as clearly in the United States’ favor as in Lebanon. The challenges in Lebanon have presented the US with a defining test: whether Washington and its partners have the determination to convert Iran’s material losses into lasting strategic change.

The 20-point plan for Gaza introduced before the war with Iran began has languished, with no meaningful recovery, reconstruction, Hamas disarmament, governance transition, or Israeli withdrawal. The diplomatic pivot back to Gaza in late July and early August suggests that the Iran war’s stubborn persistence may be causing the US and regional actors to seek wins on other fronts.

The American-Israeli campaign against Iran that began in February 2026 resulted in a regional conflict its authors never intended. The war’s chief product is not what the United States and Israel destroyed, though that was significant, but what Iran proved: that it holds a strategic lever over its neighbors, the world economy, and the US.

The major wars Iran fights become the prism through which its leaders interpret future threats and opportunities. For four decades, Iranian foreign policy has reflected lessons learned from the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. Similarly, the US-Israeli wars of 2025 and 2026 will shape how Tehran thinks about deterrence, diplomacy, regional relationships, and the use of military power.

It has become a commonplace for Americans to describe our current war with Iran as stuck in a kind of limbo, neither full war nor real peace. We’re not the only ones. Iraq finds itself caught in a limbo of its own, and like our own muddled state of affairs, theirs too is one largely — but not solely — of our devising.

Six months after the war began, Iran is neither collapsing nor returning to the order that existed before Israel and the US struck on February 28. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, senior commanders and scientists were assassinated, and military, energy, and nuclear infrastructure were hit hard. The state kept functioning anyway. What that survival has obscured is how much shifted underneath it.

When President Donald Trump ordered US forces into war against Iran, the administration’s ambitions reached well beyond Tehran’s nuclear program. Trump openly encouraged Iranians to topple their government. Israeli leaders spoke of reshaping the Middle East. The war’s architects got their wish — only not in the way they intended.

The conventional framing of China’s role in the Middle East in policy discourse centers on a familiar question: what challenge does Beijing pose to US primacy? The answer is often framed as a largely linear story in which expanding economic influence gradually translates into geopolitical leverage.  Yet this view captures only part of the reality.

Europe did not choose the war with Iran, and most European governments still resist describing themselves as participants in it. But six months of military basing, missile-defense drawdowns, energy shocks, sanctions pressure and planning for possible migration crisis have made that distance harder to sustain.