As a result of the Iran war, Turkish thinking about nuclear weapons appears to be shifting. Iran’s emergent ability to threaten regional states (and possible determination to acquire a nuclear weapon itself), growing concern about Israeli aggressiveness, doubts about US security guarantees, and greater Saudi nuclear autonomy are all pushing Ankara to consider a future nuclear option.
Hizballah: The murderers of elected Lebanese politicians, the killers of peacekeepers, the thugs of the streets they dominated because all other militias had disarmed, the agents of destruction of their own communities on behalf of foreign paymasters reigning 1,000 miles away from Beirut, the brainwashers of children into an ideology of “resistance” that only invited invasion. That’s the Hizballah that today is begging the Lebanese state to return to them the 1,000 pounds of explosives so rudely taken from them by Lebanese soldiers doing their job at a checkpoint in the Bekaa Valley.
Many of the immediate consequences of the Israeli-American war with Iran are already clear. The further emergence of drones and missiles as dominant weapons of war; the danger to the global economy from the threats to vital chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb; and the inadequacy of US weapons procurement, among other issues, have garnered widespread and entirely merited attention.
Since 1967, Israeli settlements in the West Bank have been a contested feature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The ultimate disposition of the settlements and ongoing activity related to their growth have repeatedly defied agreement in negotiations over a resolution to the conflict.
The Houthis are a political-military faction and Zaydi religious movement founded in northwestern Yemen in the 1980s. A key member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance with links to other militant organizations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, the group has continued to pose a threat to Western interests on a global scale.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a proposed multinational infrastructure initiative aimed at upgrading connectivity between the three regions through integrated trade, energy, and digital networks. Announced at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023, IMEC is envisioned partially as a counterweight to China’s international infrastructure project, the Belt and Road Initiative.
After a decade of post-Arab Spring isolation, Turkey’s leaders have recognized that their ambition to position the country as an agenda-setter on the world stage requires active engagement in all directions. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s consolidation of executive authority has centralized foreign policy decision-making and tied it to his domestic political priorities, transforming the country’s revisionist approach to one shaped primarily by personal and pragmatic interests.
MEI Senior Fellow Brian Katulis engages friends, colleagues, and policy experts in casual conversations on the most important happenings in the Middle East.
From Oil to AI: How Water Constraints Shape the Gulf’s Digital Future
Gulf Cooperation Council states are investing hundreds of billions in AI infrastructure, data centers, and semiconductor capabilities, making technology central to post-oil economic diversification. Yet this expansion faces a critical constraint: severe water scarcity turns AI growth into a challenge, as data centers in some of the world’s most water-stressed territories strain already overextended hydrological systems. The U.S.-Iran war has also underscored the physical vulnerability of the infrastructure supporting these ambitions. Together, these pressures raise pressing questions about the sustainability and scalability of Gulf states’ AI-driven development strategies.
Within 48 hours this week, Iran filled six of the most important posts in its battered military and security establishment. Read together with the biographies and mandates behind them, the appointments show how Tehran is drawing lessons from successive wars and preparing for a prolonged period of insecurity, without proving it has abandoned negotiation.
In an August 9 interview with Axios, when asked about the endless swings of the Iran standoff, he shrugged it off as familiar territory. “It’ll work out in the end. It always does. It’s like a chess game.”
With sanctions repealed, Syrian policymakers must ensure that growing volumes of credit reach beyond the narrow political and commercial networks that have generally dominated Syrian finance. That will require a credit strategy aimed at sectors and regions historically excluded from formal finance. Syria’s specialized state banks offer an imperfect but ready-made mechanism to do so.
Washington’s Four Wrong Assumptions About the Iran War
The United States has long confused Iran for a rational actor with a low pain threshold, sensitive to battlefield losses and vulnerable to domestic unrest, which would bring it to the negotiating table. Each of those assumptions is wrong.
Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Iran war has been defined by a sustained effort to avoid direct entanglement. That restraint was notable given Riyadh’s position as Iran’s principal Gulf rival, its close security relationship with Washington, and its exposure to regional escalation. The kingdom made clear that it would not permit its territory or airspace to be used by any party for military action against Iran, avoided rhetorical alignment with Israel, and preserved the diplomatic channels with Tehran that were restored in 2023.
The “Anti-Strategic President” Needs to Revive a Policy Process to Resolve Iran
President Donald Trump’s disdain for strategy extends to process: mass National Security Council firings and reliance on a tiny circle of advisors have left the interagency policy process dormant amid the Iran war. The result is improvised, damaging moves like the Strait of Hormuz toll scheme. Reviving a professional, deliberative policy process is essential.
It has become a commonplace for Americans to describe our current war with Iran as stuck in a kind of limbo, neither full war nor real peace. We’re not the only ones. Iraq finds itself caught in a limbo of its own, between America and Iran, between the tolerable and the intolerable, between progress and relapse.
The Iraqi Peshmerga, the military arm of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), remains one of the United States’ most important defense partners in the Middle East. This monograph provides an in-depth assessment of Peshmerga combat effectiveness, particularly considering its experience in the war against the Islamic State and its subsequent clash with the Iraqi Army and Iran-backed militias. Drawing on past research and more than two dozen interviews with Peshmerga officers, US military officers, and subject matter experts, this study includes detailed policy recommendations as well as a discussion of their implications.
MENA Energy Recap, Q2-2026: Mideast Energy Confronts its Hormuz Era
The MENA Energy Recap is a quarterly review of key energy developments that took place in the region from April through June of 2026 and what they signal in the months ahead. The Recap views these developments through the lens of policy and strategy, energy security, and markets.
In many ways, the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran and the war in Gaza that preceded it seem transformative. After decades of shadow warfare, Iran and Israel have now attacked each other’s homelands directly. And Israel and the United States have joined forces in a genuinely novel way to wage war against Iran.
It is now clear the United States is sinking into the quagmire of its war with Iran with no clear idea of how to get out. More than five months of intermittent bombing of Iran have not brought Tehran any closer to surrender. Recurring threats by US President Donald Trump to launch a massive military campaign against the country aren’t causing Iran to submit to US demands.
As the US-Israel-Iran war enters its sixth month, the conflict has taken a sharp turn. After a brief lull in the fighting, Iran launched a surprise ballistic missile attack on US forces on July 28, and the US and Saudi Arabia struck back at Iran-backed militias in Iraq, marking Riyadh’s entry into the war. MEI Senior Fellow Alex Vatanka joins host Alistair Taylor to discuss the escalation, what may come next, and the state of talks over sharing the Strait of Hormuz.
Beyond Ports: China’s Digital Networks of Influence in the Middle East and Africa
For more than a decade, assessments of Chinese strategy in the Middle East and Africa have focused on assets, including the ports Chinese firms own, the pipelines they finance, and the networks they build. This lens has produced familiar maps of Chinese “footholds” and debates over future military bases, but ownership alone reveals less about influence.
The more useful question is not what China owns, but how Chinese firms become embedded in the operational and digital systems that keep trade corridors moving. Influence derives not from controlling infrastructure outright but from participating in the governance of the networks that move goods, data, finance, and information across them.
United States Central Command (CENTCOM), one of the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) six geographical combatant commands, is responsible for countering threats, responding to crises, and strengthening regional stability in the Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of South Asia.
The oldest peer-reviewed publication dedicated to the study of the modern Middle East, MEI’s flagship journal covers politics, society, and culture in the region.
