Research & Commentary Results

When Iranian drones struck two Amazon Web Services data centers in the UAE on March 1, 2026, and damaged a third in Bahrain the same morning, many thought this could spell the end of the Gulf’s AI ambitions. Whatever the intent, the attacks highlighted the new reality that data centers have now become targets in inter-state wars.

When President Donald Trump ordered US forces into war against Iran, the administration’s ambitions reached well beyond Tehran’s nuclear program. Trump openly encouraged Iranians to topple their government. Israeli leaders spoke of reshaping the Middle East. The war’s architects got their wish — only not in the way they intended.

Egypt, which is not party to the war on Iran, has become a target as well as an intermediary in the conflict. As a result, the war has affected Egypt’s future calculations, particularly in three major areas: its economy, its security, and its regional alliances. 

The conventional framing of China’s role in the Middle East in policy discourse centers on a familiar question: what challenge does Beijing pose to US primacy? The answer is often framed as a largely linear story in which expanding economic influence gradually translates into geopolitical leverage.  Yet this view captures only part of the reality.

Europe did not choose the war with Iran, and most European governments still resist describing themselves as participants in it. But six months of military basing, missile-defense drawdowns, energy shocks, sanctions pressure and planning for possible migration crisis have made that distance harder to sustain.

As Washington scrambled to contain the consequences of the Houthis’ dramatic advance along Yemen’s Red Sea coast last week, US Vice President JD Vance confirmed US media reports that the Trump administration was “engaged in direct conversations with the Houthis.”

Turkish ambitions to develop nuclear weapons are not new, but the changing security environment is strengthening Ankara’s motivations and rationale for moving away from its longstanding role as a champion of nonproliferation and toward a strategy of preserving the option to build nuclear weapons without actually pursuing them. The challenge for Washington is to manage the nuclear trajectory of regional powers such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia rather than preventing them from acquiring greater nuclear capabilities altogether.

When President Xi Jinping arrived in Cairo this week for his first state visit to Egypt in a decade, trade, investment and geopolitics were inevitably high on the agenda. But Xi also made something else unusually prominent: culture.

Brian is joined by Amb. (ret.) Yael Lempert, Vice President for Outreach at MEI, to discuss her career in diplomacy and the importance of US diplomatic efforts abroad. She shares stories from postings across the Middle East in Baghdad, Cairo, Tripoli, Jerusalem, and Amman and examines how her personal and professional experiences shaped her approach to the work. Together, Brian and Yael discuss the realities of life in the Foreign Service, the core tenets of American diplomacy, and why it matters in today’s Middle East.

North African governments have sought to remain outside the US-Iran conflict, regardless of their differing alignments and preferences. Geography insulates them from the fighting, but not from the consequences. That duality is the region’s predicament: what makes North Africa useful to others is what leaves it exposed.

Of all the fronts in President Trump’s peacemaking agenda, the South Caucasus has delivered the most concrete results. The August 2025 Washington Declaration, signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan and witnessed by Trump, marked an important step toward peace in the region. The two sides initialed a peace agreement and advanced plans to unblock regional connectivity, including through the establishment of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhijevan exclave through southern Armenia. Implementation of TRIPP has since made notable progress, but construction has yet to start. A breakthrough on those two tracks would, in turn, unlock Armenia–Türkiye normalization, transforming a long-fractured region into an area of trade and interdependence.

Wars don’t just end. They get interpreted, reinterpreted, and turned into strategic doctrine. That is what happened after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, a conflict that saw the United States back Tehran’s Iraqi adversaries. The war taught Tehran three lessons it never unlearned: that Washington wants the Islamic Republic gone, that Iran stands essentially alone in the world, and that it cannot survive a direct, overt fight with the U.S. and Israel.

Within 48 hours this week, Iran filled six of the most important posts in its battered military and security establishment. Read together with the biographies and mandates behind them, the appointments show how Tehran is drawing lessons from successive wars and preparing for a prolonged period of insecurity, without proving it has abandoned negotiation.

In an August 9 interview with Axios, when asked about the endless swings of the Iran standoff, he shrugged it off as familiar territory. “It’ll work out in the end. It always does. It’s like a chess game.”

Behind the rhetoric sat a harder fact.

The United States has long confused Iran for a rational actor with a low pain threshold, sensitive to battlefield losses and vulnerable to domestic unrest, which would bring it to the negotiating table. Each of those assumptions is wrong.