Research & Commentary Results

The opposition in Congress is attempting to force a war powers vote on the Trump administration’s Iran operation, with an eye toward the 60-day deadline on military action legally imposed on the executive branch; and key defense-spending measures are also on the immediate horizon. These actions on Capitol Hill could shape the trajectory of how the US moves forward in Iran and the region — and influence Americans’ overall appetite for long-term engagement in the Middle East.

The Iran war has posed significant immediate challenges for Turkey, including rising energy prices. But Turkish officials think that Ankara could reap benefits from the war in the long term.

Did the presence of American military bases in the Gulf monarchies draw those states into the American-Israeli war against Iran, a war they had no say in initiating and no voice in prosecuting? That is certainly the feeling among some citizens of those states.

As a fragile cease-fire takes hold in the Middle East, countries are jockeying to shape the peace. But one group remains largely absent: US ambassadors.

This special episode of Middle East Focus features a conversation from MEI’s Virtual Briefing Series. Host Alistair Taylor is joined by former National Security Council Senior Director Stephen Flanagan and MEI Senior Fellow Iulia-Sabina Joja to discuss the impacts of the Iran war on US-European relations. The conflict has hit Europe’s economy hard and created deep divisions across the continent, even as some European countries play a quiet supporting role to the US. President Donald Trump has called for NATO member states to help secure shipping through the Iranian-blocked Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for international maritime trade. Flanagan and Joja explore the prospects for stepped-up European military involvement, the knock-on effects on the war in Ukraine, and the potential longer-term impact on the future of the US-European alliance.

When the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran a month ago, the Middle East was plunged into debilitating conflict. Nevertheless, Syria has remarkably just completed its most stable month in 15 years. Damascus and its international partners must capitalize on this opportunity.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states are confronting the greatest threat to their economic security and energy strategy since their formation. The economic fallout of the US-Israeli war with Iran is severe, but uneven across the Gulf. So too is each state’s ability to sustain energy exports and protect critical infrastructure—both of which have been targeted unequally by Iran.  

The US-Israeli war against Iran has created the largest disruption to global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies in modern history. There is a tremendous amount of economic uncertainty for Gulf states to navigate, and it will reshape the way they engage with one another and with Iran, Israel, and the United States for years to come. But this war has also laid bare how urgently the United States needs to update its own approach toward the Gulf states when it comes to energy.

China’s expanding role in the Middle East is often framed as geopolitical rivalry with other global powers, including the United States, Russia, India, and others; but this lens obscures the strategic subtlety of Beijing’s approach.

“Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat” is a well-known axiom attributed to the ancient Chinese military general and strategist, Sun Tzu. With the Iran war now at the one-month mark, it is evident that the Trump administration failed to outline a clear end state or devise a workable war termination strategy before initiating Operation Epic Fury on February 28.

North African states feel the consequences of the US-Israel war with Iran less through direct security risks than through economic shocks that affect long-term stability. The region remains highly exposed to disruptions in global food and energy markets, where price spikes can lead to fiscal pressure, inflation, and social unrest.

The economic stress points vary considerably across the Gulf. Assuming a resumption of exports by May, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, and Qatar still face sharply declining revenues and contracting GDP—as much as 14 percent in Kuwait and Qatar—because of shut ins, time to restart, and lack of alternative delivery routes. After the Iranian attacks on Ras Laffan, Qatar’s economic outlook and time to recovery look much more difficult.

Gulf states — including their national oil companies and sovereign and related entities — are energy giants. They understand the risks of a prolonged threat from Iran and did not choose this war. They also recognize the risks of their geographic location, should the region endure another bout of instability and dislocation from a fragmented and collapsing neighbor.